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Reliability Needs in Future DoD Systems
Abstract
An overview will be presented of the military challenge we are currently facing along with our investment
strategy for developing advanced weapons systems. The major role of improved reliability in reducing both the
operation and maintenance costs as well as increasing our military combat capability will be examined along
with the key role of R&D programs in meeting future reliability requirements. Finally, some of the new
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RELIABILITY NEEDS IN FUTURE DoD SYTEMS 
Keynote Address by Arden L. Bement, Jr. 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering 
Research & Advanced Technology 
Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 
ABSTRACT 
An overview will be presented of the military challenge we are currently facing along with our invest-
ment strategy for developing advanced weapons systems. The major role of improved reliability in reduc-
ing both the operation and maintenance costs as well as increasing our military combat capability will be 
examined along with the key role of R&D programs in meeting future reliability requirements. Finally, 
some of the new policies we have initiated aimed at developing a more effective DoD R&D program will be 
presented. 
Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen. It is a 
distinct pleasure for me to join with you in the 
sixth annual DARPA/AF review of progress in quan-
titative nondestructive evaluation. The agenda 
certainly promises a very stimulating and tech-
nically exciting meeting. 
I would like to provide you with a cursory 
overview of current OSD thinking as to the threats 
we are facing, and the future capabilities we are 
currently developing. The role of improved relia-
bility in both reducing operation and maintenance 
costs as well as increasing our military capabil-
ity wi 11 be ex ami ned and the key ro 1 e of R&D pro-
grams in meeting future reliability requirements 
will be discussed. Finally, some of the new 
policies we have initiated to develop a more ef-
fective R&D program will be presented. 
The Challenge 
For years we have acknowledged that the Soviet 
Union held a quantitativ~ lead in military equip-
ment but believed that our qualitative lead would 
more than compensate for this. It is time to re-
examine that belief and to reject the complacency 
that went with it. During the decade of the 
1970s, the Soviet Union made a major advance in 
the development and production of defense materi-
al, and as a consequence will enter the 1980's in 
a dramatically different defense posture than they 
had as they entered the 1970's. 
Their objective was to challenge the u.s. lead 
in defense technology while maintaining their nu-
merical advantage. They have had a remarkable 
degree of success in achieving that objective by 
making an enormous investment, and by maintaining 
an unwavering emphasis on technology. The Soviet 
Union started the 1970's with an annual defense 
investment (RDT&E, procurement and military con-
struction) approximately equal to that of the u.s. 
But they have increased at a steady rate of four 
percent per year since then, while the u.s. in-
vestment decreased in real terms every year until 
1975. As a result, the Soviet Union invested over 
the decade about $240 billion (in FY 1981 dollars) 
more than the u.s. This differential exceeds the 
estimated acquisition cost (in 1981 dollars) of 
1,000 F-16s, 1,000 F-18s, 10,000 XM-1 tanks, 20 
CG-47 guided missile cruisers, 50 SSN attack 
submarines, 20 TRIDENT submarines (with missiles), 
the entire M-X program, and an additional $70 
bfll ion in R&D. 
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Generally speaking, they have used this in-
vestment increment to produce large quantities of 
equipment, thus maintaining their numerical ad-
vantage. But as they try to match the sophistica-
tion of U.S. equipment, the unit cost of Soviet 
equipment has substantially increased. For ex-
ample, we estimate that the cost of their MIG-23 
approaches that of our F-16. 
Another indicator of future plans is the Soviet 
R&D program. While our estimates of Soviet in-
vestment in R&D have significant uncertainties, 
the evidence is compelling that their program is 
about twice the size of ours. We can make a fair 
evaluation of this by observing their test pro-
grams, where we can identify about 50 major sys-
tems (ships, submarines, aircraft, and missiles) 
in various stages of test and evaluation. Some of 
these systems are quite significant. We can also 
assess some portions of their technology programs. 
By observing laser test activity, for example, we 
estimate that their high energy laser program is 
about four times the size of ours. Overall, dur-
ing the decade of the 70s, the Soviets invested 
about $70 billion more than we did in Defense R&D. 
It is quite clear that their R&D program has had 
the highest priority access to funds, to trained 
personnel and to scarce materials, to the extent 
that they have imposed serious hardships on their 
non-defense industry. As a result, their non-
defense industry is not competitive in world 
markets. 
In summary, we can see the Soviets entering the 
decade of the 1980s with a commitment to compete 
in quality with u.s. weapon systems. A major 
start has already been made in that direction, 
with the acceptance of the much higher unit cost 
implied by this commitment. They are accepting 
this increased unit cost without decreasing their 
traditional emphasis on quantity, simply by in-
creasing their total investment in weapons produc-
tion to where it is now 85 percent greater than 
ours. That they plan to continue this emphasis 
throughout the 1980s is made clear by the major 
increases made in the 1970s in production plants 
and in defense RDT&E. 
Our Investment Strategy 
The challenge described in the previous section 
is formidable. We are behind quantitatively in 
deployed equipment and are falling further behind 
because of disparities in equipment production 
rates. While we are still ahead in defense tech-
nology, we are in danger of losing that advantage 
because of massive Soviet spending in defense R&D. 
But we also have some distinctive advantages: a 
superior technological base, a competitive indus-
try with greater productivity, and allies with a 
substantial industrial capability. In order to 
meet the formidable challenge we face, our invest-
ment strategy must fully exploit these advantages. 
Our overriding near term need is to get on with 
the modernization of our forces. Our technology 
is of little use to our armed forces when it is 
not embodied in operational equipment. Most of 
our ground forces weapon systems now deployed -
our main battle tank, our armored personnel car-
rier, our air defense gun and missile, our attack 
helicopter- were developed during the fifties and 
entered production in the sixties. As a conse-
quence they simply do not incorporate current 
technology, and they provide maintenance and sup-
port problems created by their age. 
Fortunately, a new generation of weapon systems 
was developed during the seventies and is now 
ready for production. This includes: (1) equip-
ment already in production - a new nuclear submar-
ine and missiles, new ships and tactical aircraft; 
(2) equipment just entering production - a new 
main battle tank utility helicopter, laser guided 
projectiles, and the Air Launched Cruise Missile; 
(3) equipment which will be ready for production 
in a year or two - a new air defense gun, multiple 
launch rocket system, air-to-ground missile, and 
advanced helicopters. 
The DoD Science and Technology program provides 
the technical foundation necessary for the devel-
opment of new weapons systems and provides us in-
surance against technological surprise. This 
technology base permits us to multiply our force 
effectiveness through improved performance and to 
develop new technology to address defense costs, 
acquisition barriers, and readiness. Those re-
quirements that must be addressed by technical so-
lutions include: improved reliability (which is 
"designed-in" and "manufactured-in" not just 
"tested-in"); life extension and durability of 
costly military hardware; conservation, substi-
tution, and recycling technologies for critical 
materials; increased productivity and reduced 
manufacturing costs in our defense industrial 
base. 
The Role of Reliability 
Many of you are aware of some of the reliabil-
ity problems we have recently experienced in DoD. 
The durability and reliability problems associated 
with the F-100 engine in the F-15 and F-16 aircraft 
are currently receiving considerable attention. 
In the procurement and operation of weapons 
systems a major objective is to minimize the total 
life-cycle cost while achieving a given force cap-
ability. Weapon system life-cycle analysis must 
be concerned not only with life-cycle costs but 
also with the capability of the weapon system. 
What are you getting for the price you are paying? 
This military capability includes a number of 
areas: availability of the force, particularly in 
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terms of a capability level achieved at some date, 
the availability of individual systems to conduct 
combat missions, the sortie success of that weapon 
system in the conduct of its mission and the mis-
sion effectiveness in terms of the design criteria 
of interest. (In the case of a close-air-support 
mission, for example, this includes payload capac-
ity, radius, loiter time, maneuverability, de-
livery accuracy, and survivability.) The design 
criteria is the component of military capability 
that is most easily addressed during the develop-
ment and acquisition of a new weapon system. How-
ever, our overall military capability is directly 
dependent on the availability and reliability of 
these systems for performing their mission. 
In order to illustrate the importance of these 
issues I have chosen to review with you some of 
our experiences with the life cycle costs and 
operational capability of the Air Force A-70 
aircraft. 
There are obvious problems with examining a 
specific system. First of all, no one system is 
really representative. Thus, it is difficult to 
generalize any lessons which might be learned. 
Second, the acquisition process is in a constant 
state of evolution and therefore, it is difficult 
to discern legitimate similarities between past 
problems and present procedures. Notwithstanding 
these difficulties, one way of improving upon our 
past acquisition performance is to first identify 
the deficiencies in past programs and second 
evaluate alternative policies in the "real-world" 
contexts of those program environments. 
Life Cycle Cost of the A-70 
A measure of a weapon's "total cost" is the 
present value of all previous and forthcoming ex-
penditures directly related to the RDT&E, procure-
ment, and ownership (i.e., operation) of the sys-
tem. Such a "total cost" is referred to as a 
life-cycle cost. At the time that a life-cycle 
cost is calculated, forthcoming expenditures can 
only be estimated, whereas expenditures to date 
should be measurable with a fair degree of accu-
racy. In theory, the life-cycle cost measure is 
very attractive for indicating the magnitude of 
the potential tradeoffs of resources among the de-
velopment, production, and operating phases of a 
system in order to optimize capability and cost 
characteristics. 
Figure 1 presents an FY 1973 calculated 
projection of life-cycle cost for the A-70 in 
terms of FY 1973 dollars. Since the aircraft was 
still in production during FY 1973, the life-cycle 
cost is stated in terms of a per aircraft cost 
rather than a fleet cost. The acquisition cost is 
based upon the total planned buy (411 aircraft) as 
of FY 1973. The estimated costs of ownership are 
based upon the assumption that the FY 1973 
observed average per unit operating cost is 
representative of the ownership costs for the 
duration of the aircraft's useful life, which is 
assumed to be 15 years. 
With certain assumptions as to discount rate 
and inflation this viewgraph shows that the cost 
of ownership is approximately 30 percent higher 
than the acquisition cost. Since the ownership 
Fig. 1 A-70 15-year life-cycle cost in 1973 
dollars. 
costs are so dependent on several unknowns, it is 
sufficient to conclude that the ownership costs 
will generally exceed the acquisition costs. 
Several of the costs of ownership are not very 
sensitive to the reliability and maintainability 
of the weapon system (e.g., training (TNG), petro-
leum, oils, and lubricants (POL), and base opera-
ting support (BOS)). However, the largest portion 
- the remaining 79 pecent of the ownership costs 
(e.g., operation and maintenance (O&M), depot, and 
investment) - are very sensitive to weapon-system 
reliability and maintainability as well as man-
ning, support, and deployment decisions. The 
base-level O&M costs alone account for nearly 50 
percent of the ownership costs. One of the ele-
ments of the O&M cost which is particularly sen-
sitive to the weapon system's reliability and 
maintainability is the labor cost for unscheduled 
maintenance at the base. 
Therefore, we can potentially avoid major 
future costs associated with weapon systems by 
improving the reliability and maintainability of 
these systems. Clearly we have to address these 
issues both before, during and after production of 
weapons systems. 
Military Capability of the A-70 
The capability of the weapon system is the 
other key issue that is impacted by re 1i ability 
and again I would like to use the A-70 as an ex-
ample. The tactical mission of the A-70 makes the 
number of combat sorties that can be generated per 
day of major importance in determining the mili-
tary utility of this weapon system. 
As shown in Fig. 2, even if no subsystems fail, 
there is an upper limit to the number of combat 
sorties that can be launched by the average air-
craft in a combat day. For example, for a two hr 
close air support mission, about 3.3 hours are 
needed for fueling, gun loading, bomb loading, and 
preflight and postflight inspections. This means 
that at most, four and a half sorties can be flown 
per aircraft in a twenty-four hour combat day. 
First, let's focus on the combat readiness 
assessments for 1968 and 1970. The 1968 assess-
ment is based upon LTV's subsystem reliability 
estimates which were made midway through the re-
search and development phase. As you can see, the 







Fig. 2 Combat readiness assessment for the A-70. 
over three combat sorties/day/aircraft. In 1970, 
towards the end of the test program, the contrac-
tor revised its subsystem reliability estimates, 
and estimated that only 2.5 sorties/day was pos-
sible. At about the same point in time, the Air 
Force made an independent estimate of the subsys-
tem reliability and projected less than a two 
sortie/day capability. An initial user oriented 
operational test in 1970 was also conducted and 
resulted in a sortie rate of slightly over one 
sortie/day. 
Now look at the 1973 operational data in which 
we obtained a capability of less than 1 
sortie/day. 
The difference between the limiting number of 
4.5 sorties/day and the top of the three bars is 
totally due to the down-time for unscheduled main-
tenance which is incurred because of subsystem 
failures. If no failures occurred, there would be 
no unscheduled downtime. 
Thus far, we have been considering this sortie 
generation capability on an average aircraft 
basis. In Fig. 3 we will consider it on a fleet 
basis. If the aircraft, which were delivered to 
the Air Force, were as reliable as the contrac-
tor's pre-production estimate, then the fleet 
sortie generation capability would have built up 
according to the top curve. The 1975 capability 
would have been about 1400 sorties/day. Of course, 
the actual buildup followed the bottom curve to a 
1975 capability of about 400 sorties/day. 
Therefore, we obtained in 1975 only 28% of the 
military capability that we had planned for in 
1968. 
Clearly there are many actions that have been 
taken since we acquired the A-70 to improve the 
acquisition process. We are continuously striving 
to develop improved management procedures to ob-
tain the most cost effective weapons system. 
However, there is a limit to the reliability· 
improvements we can obtain from management and 
policy changes alone. We have to develop an engi-
neering capability to "design-in" and 
"manufacture-in" and not just "test-in" reliabil-
ity. We are concerned about the entire area of 
quality and with it the classic problems of 
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Fig. 3 Estimated combat readiness for the A-7D 
fleet. 
evaluation of the future performance of compo-
nents. The Department of Defense needs the 
scientific knowledge which you are involved in 
developing, and most importantly it needs it 
reduced to practice in manufacturing and main-
tenance. In my office we have taken several 
initiatives to help achieve these objectives. 
The sustained growth in the S&T Program over 
the past three years has made possible a number of 
beneficial initiatives which were not possible 
during the "undernourished" years of the early 
1970's. We are making substantial progress in 
closing the interfaces between the Science and 
Technology (S&T) Program and the Advanced Develop-
ment Programs to improve the flow of technology 
toward application. We are strengthening our re-
lationship with universities in order to use the 
research and development resources of the academic 
community more effectively. We are able to in-
crease the pace of progress in the research and 
development cycle through focused investments, 
critical mass funding, multidisciplinary attack on 
complex problems, and coupled programs involving 
university, industrial, and DoD laboratory re-
search teams working in concert to exploit a high-
payoff opportunity or meet a military requirement. 
The program being reviewed at this conference 
represents one of the best examples of this ap-
proach, and I believe the success to date is due, 
to a large degree, to the strong cooperation be-
tween all the participants in this interdiscipli-
nary program. Significant scientific progress in 
NDE has only recently been achieved and can easily 
be lost if real growth is not sustained. Continu-
ity in policy and investment is the most important 
ingredient for building a defense research base 
which will provide for our future national 
security. 
To maintain this technological lead time, we 
are applying three basic mechanisms within the S&T 
Program: 
• Real growth in funding our Technology 
Base; 
• Support to enhance and exploit our 
domestic advantage in commercial 
technology and our industrial base; and 
• Improved cooperation with our Allies. 
The funding for the NDE technology base within 
DoD has increased s i gni fi cantly over the 1 ast five 
years. Since FY 1975 the DoD technology base for 
NDE has increased from less than 2 million dollars 
per year to over six million dollars per year. In 
addition, the Air Force has initiated a major 
Manufacturing Technology thrust in NDE to reduce 
this technology to practice that has increased 
from no investment in FY 1975 to almost $4 million 
in FY 1980 to a planned expenditure in excess of 
18 million dollars over the next three years. The 
Army is also currently investing several million 
dollars per year in Manufacturing Technology NDE 
p;·ograms. 
We have increased our interaction with our 
allies in NDE through bilateral agreements, NATO 
workshops and TTCP activities. For example, the 
U.S. has proposed that a new panel be established 
under the TTCP materials subgroup to provide the 
necessary framework for joint programs and tech-
nical exchange between the member countries (US, 
UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand). 
As you can see from Fig. 4, the increasing 
investment in NDE is still a very small percentage 
of the total DoD Science and Technology Program. 
However, the increasing recognition of the import-
ance of quality in DoD weapon systems, the addi-
tional requirements placed on NDE by the desir-
ability of using new materials, design concepts 
and processing methods to exploit rapid solidifi-
cation technology, metal matrix and carbon/carbon 
composites as well as ceramic materials clearly 
will require increased emphasis for advanced 
quantitative NDE capabilities to ensure the 
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Fig. 4 DoD Science and Technology Program 
If you will continue the excellent research 
progress you have been making in this field and 
focus your research on the critical technical 
issues required to transition this technology to 
the user, I will work to ensure that the necessary 
policy issues are addressed to provide the Depart-
ment of Defense with the technical capability to 
field· and maintain reliable military systems. We 
must develop the capability to "design-in" and 
"manufacture-in" reliability. We can't afford to 




Don Thompson, Chairman (Ames Laboratory): Thank you very much. We have a few minutes before break for 
questions and answers. 
Doug Ballard (Sandia Laboratories): Could you predict or project what percentage of this downtime for 
sorties is attributed to electronic gear that we do not test normally by NDE methods? In other 
words, is the electronics part of the business a major factor rather than structural downtime? 
Arden Bement (Deputy Undersecretary of Defense): I can't give you precise numbers on that, but I know 
for a fact that it is, especially in radar systems, such as the replacement of traveling wave 
tubes; and it certainly is a very significant contributor in communication systems. 
Doug Ballard: Those areas are traditionally neglected by NDE right now. We don't even pay any 
attention to them. 
Arden Bement: Yes, I agree. 
Don Thompson, Chairman: Other questions? 
Arden Bement: I might say, however, during that era that this aircraft operated, we were still in 
vacuum-tube technology and are hoping that large-scale integrated circuits will provide 
improved reliability in some of those systems. 
Don Thompson, Chairman: Any other questions? If not, Arden, we thank you very much for your talk and 
presentation. 
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